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XCCDF
F5 BIG-IP Local Traffic Manager Security Technical Implementation Guide
SRG-NET-000355-ALG-000117
The F5 BIG-IP appliance providing user authentication intermediary services must only accept end entity certificates issued by DOD PKI or DOD-approved PKI Certification Authorities (CAs) for the establishment of protected sessions.
The F5 BIG-IP appliance providing user authentication intermediary services must only accept end entity certificates issued by DOD PKI or DOD-approved PKI Certification Authorities (CAs) for the establishment of protected sessions. An XCCDF Rule
The F5 BIG-IP appliance providing user authentication intermediary services must only accept end entity certificates issued by DOD PKI or DOD-approved PKI Certification Authorities (CAs) for the establishment of protected sessions.
Medium Severity
<VulnDiscussion>Non-DOD approved PKIs have not been evaluated to ensure that they have security controls and identity vetting procedures in place that are sufficient for DOD systems to rely on the identity asserted in the certificate. PKIs lacking sufficient security controls and identity vetting procedures risk being compromised and issuing certificates that enable adversaries to impersonate legitimate users.
The authoritative list of DOD-approved PKIs is published at https://cyber.mil/pki-pke/interoperability. DOD-approved PKI CAs may include Category I, II, and III certificates. Category I DOD-Approved External PKIs are PIV issuers. Category II DOD-Approved External PKIs are Non-Federal Agency PKIs cross-certified with the Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA). Category III DOD-Approved External PKIs are Foreign, Allied, or Coalition Partner PKIs.
This requirement focuses on communications protection for the application session rather than for the network packet. Thus, a critical part of the PKI configuration for BIG-IP appliances includes requiring mutual TLS (mTLS). Use of mTLS ensures session nonrepudiation, communication integrity, and confidentiality. This approach substantially reduces the likelihood of successful server-side exploits and cookie hijacking. In the Client Authentication section of the Client SSL Profile applied to the pertinent Virtual Server, the Client Certificate configuration session must be altered from "request/ignore" to "require". This modification mandates all connecting clients to furnish a Client Certificate issued from a credible source. If a client fails to comply with this requirement, they will be issued a TCP reset.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>