Protected Distribution System (PDS) Construction - Tactical Environment Application

Description

<VulnDiscussion>A PDS that is not constructed and configured as required could result in the undetected interception of classified information. Within mobile tactical situations a hardened carrier is not possible and therefore the unencrypted SIPRNet cable must be maintained within the confines of the tactical encampment with the cable under continuous observation and control to prevent exploitation by enemy forces. In theaters of operation where fixed facilities are well established, standard PDS applications must be employed unless a risk assessment is conducted to determine the vulnerabilities and risks associated with using unencrypted cable that is not in a hardened carrier. REFERENCES: CJCSI 6510.01F, INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) AND SUPPORT TO COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND), Enclosure C, paragraph 35.c. DoD 5220.22-M (NISPOM), Incorporating Change 2, 18 May 2016 Chapter 5, Section 4, paragraphs 5-402.c. and 5-403 DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, 24 February 2012, SUBJECT: DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information, Encl 4, para 3.b. and 4.a. NIST Special Publication 800-53 (SP 800-53), Rev 4, Controls: PE-4, SC-7, and SC-8 Former guidance was in the legacy/superseded NSTISSI 7003, Protected Distribution Systems, Annex B, paragraph 1.a.(7) NOTE: There is no longer specific guidance in the updated CNSSI 7003 but the guidance for Continuously Viewed Carriers is the most applicable for Tactical Environments with PDS: CNSSI No.7003, September 2015, Protected Distribution Systems (PDS), Section X, paragraph 30.e.</VulnDiscussion><FalsePositives></FalsePositives><FalseNegatives></FalseNegatives><Documentable>false</Documentable><Mitigations></Mitigations><SeverityOverrideGuidance></SeverityOverrideGuidance><PotentialImpacts></PotentialImpacts><ThirdPartyTools></ThirdPartyTools><MitigationControl></MitigationControl><Responsibility></Responsibility><IAControls></IAControls>